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Abstract 
 
Hassin recently proposed the “Yes It Can” (YIC) principle to describe the division of labor 
between conscious and unconscious processes in human cognition. According to this 
principle, unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level cognitive 
function that conscious processes can perform. In our commentary, we argue that the author 
presents an overly idealized review of the literature in support of the YIC principle. 
Furthermore, we point out that the dissimilar trends observed in social and cognitive 
psychology, with respect to published evidence of strong unconscious effects, can better be 
explained by the way how awareness is defined and measured in both research fields. Finally, 
we show that the experimental paradigm chosen by Hassin to rule out remaining objections 
against the YIC principle is unsuited to verify the new default notion that all high-level 
cognitive functions can unfold unconsciously. 
 
The “Yes It Can” (YIC) principle 
In Perspectives on Psychological Science, Hassin has recently proposed a novel principle, the 
“Yes It Can” (YIC) principle, to describe the division of labor between conscious and 
unconscious processes in human cognition (Hassin, 2013). In brief, the YIC principle states 
that “unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level [cognitive] function 
that conscious processes can perform” (p.195). According to Hassin, two observations lend a 
priori plausibility to the YIC principle. First, conscious processing has been shown to be 
severely capacity-limited (Baddeley, 2007). Second, some theories suggest that conscious 
awareness as we experience it today might be a relatively recent evolutionary development 
(Dennett, 1991). Hassin concludes that, therefore, “fundamental cognitive functions are likely 
to occur outside of conscious awareness” (p.195). 
The author then reviews a wide and diverse range of supporting evidence from cognitive and 
social psychology, as well as the cognitive neurosciences. The selected studies unanimously 
show that high-level cognitive functions that were previously thought of as requiring 
consciousness can indeed occur nonconsciously, i.e., without awareness of the relevant 
stimuli or without awareness of the influence of the relevant stimuli, respectively. In 
particular, he presents empirical data from four different subsets of cognitive functions, 
namely cognitive control (e.g., conflict adaptation), goal pursuit (e.g., goal priming), 
information broadcasting (e.g., semantic priming), and reasoning (e.g., decision making). 
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What is more, Hassin provides a surprisingly simple recipe for testing whether a cognitive 
operation can be performed unconsciously. The operation should be stripped “into its basic-
level functions” and submitted to an experimental design which “(a) tests the functions while 
(b) allowing the processes to occur nonconsciously” (p.200). The YIC principle predicts that 
based on this recipe any cognitive function of interest will be found to be performed 
unconsciously. Hassin concludes his paper by acknowledging that default notions are of great 
importance for the advancement of science, and he expresses his hope that the YIC principle 
will help establish a new default mode of thinking about the abilities of the unconscious. 
 
Hassin’s idealized review of the literature 
In support of the YIC principle, Hassin presents an idealized review of the literature, without 
a single reference to conflicting evidence, methodological debates or recent discussions of the 
reproducibility of psychological studies. This selective focus inevitably creates the impression 
that indeed the majority of cognitive functions have already been proven to function 
unconsciously. For example, one major line of research reviewed by Hassin suggests that 
complex decisions might benefit from a period of time in which participants engage in what is 
referred to as “unconscious thought” (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). What remains unmentioned is 
that the theory’s main claims and decision task have been met with severe methodological as 
well as theoretical criticism (Gonzalez-Vallejo et al., 2008;Waroquier et al., 2009), and that 
further empirical tests of the unconscious thought theory’s predictions yielded no evidence in 
favor of these predictions [(Huizenga et al., 2012); for a recent meta-analysis and large-scale 
replication attempt of the unconscious thought advantage, see (Nieuwenstein et al., 2015)]. 
In his review of the literature, Hassin also cites his own work on priming which suggests that 
both invisible (Hassin et al., 2007) and visible yet subtle (Carter et al., 2011) exposure to 
national flags significantly changed political attitudes and voting intentions up to eight 
months later. Only after publication of the YIC principle, a large-scale, preregistered “many 
labs” replication project did not replicate the finding that visible yet subtle exposure to the 
American flag increased conservatism among US participants (Klein et al., 2014). While 
replication should become a standard tool in psychological science to confirm the accuracy of 
empirical findings, clarify the conditions under which an effect can be observed, and estimate 
the true effect size (Open_Science_Collaboration, 2012;Simons, 2014), failures to replicate 
often leave relevant questions unanswered, in particular questions about the specificity of the 
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underlying theories (Klein, 2014)
1
. It is important to note that Hassin and colleagues 
supported the replication attempt and acknowledged the failure to replicate the flag priming 
effect, but also raised the issue of whether it was a “conceptual” rather than “direct” 
replication, and they addressed the importance of identifying potential moderators of the 
original phenomenon and of understanding the theory behind the effects (Ferguson et al., 
2014). 
In sum, we believe that a nuanced review of the literature on unconscious processing would 
not only be more adequate, but also convey a more veridical picture telling us “definitely 
maybe” rather than “yes it can”, as an answer to the question of whether unconscious 
processes perform the same functions as conscious processes. 
 
Unconscious priming in social and cognitive psychology 
In a synthetic attempt, Hassin brings together two largely separate research traditions in his 
overview of the literature, namely the research on unconscious priming effects in social 
psychology, on the one hand, and cognitive psychology, on the other. As pointed out by 
Hassin, the scope and limits of semantic subliminal priming have been debated among 
cognitive psychologists over the course of decades (Eriksen, 1960;Marcel, 1983;Greenwald, 
1992;Kouider and Dehaene, 2007), with views shifting almost pendulum-like across time, 
while research in the field of social psychology, almost simultaneously, accumulated evidence 
for unconscious priming effects following a monotonically upward trend, in particular for 
behavioral priming effects. For example, conceptual replications of the influential study 
showing that subtle primes could affect overt behavior (Bargh et al., 1996) are abundant. 
Amongst others, participants primed with the concept of “politician” wrote essays that were 
considerably longer than did control participants (Dijksterhuis and Van Knippenberg, 2000), 
and the presence of a backpack in the experimental room primed more cooperative behavior, 
while the presence of a briefcase primed more competitive behavior (Kay et al., 2004). 
In a recent opinion paper published in Perspectives on Psychological Science (as part of a 
special section described in footnote 1), Dijksterhuis estimated that there are between 200 and 
                                                          
1
 We would like to direct the reader’s attention towards two related special issues which appeared in 
Perspectives on Psychological Science: the November 2012 issue dedicated to the topics of replicability and 
research practices, and the January 2014 issue which features a special section focused on behavioral priming 
research and attemps at replication. A further target article on the replicability in psychology and open peer 
commentary can be found in a recent edition of the European Journal of Personality (Asendorpf et al. 2013). 
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400 empirical behavioral priming papers by now (Dijksterhuis, 2014). To explain the 
dissimilar trends in social and cognitive psychology, Hassin argues that “the unconscious is 
likely to engage in motivationally relevant and interesting issues (such as goals, stereotypes, 
and incentives) more than in motivationally irrelevant and less interesting issues (such as the 
relations between chairs and tables)” (p.201). As an alternative to this motivational account, 
Doyen et al. have convincingly elaborated three sources of conflict between the two research 
fields: awareness, processes, and replicability (Doyen et al., 2014). With respect to awareness, 
the authors argue that in social psychology the absence of awareness is often assumed rather 
than tested, and when tests are conducted, they are below the standards widely used in 
cognitive psychology. Similarly, it has been suggested that in social psychology experiments 
on behavioral priming there has been a problematic shift from defining unconscious as 
“without awareness of the stimuli” (as in cognitive psychology) to “without awareness of the 
influence of the stimuli” (Stafford, 2014). Thus, rather than a new default mode of thinking 
about the abilities of the unconscious, the joint efforts of social and cognitive psychology 
should help establish a new default of measuring stimulus awareness in the diverse range of 
priming experiments. This stringent default should entail that for each experiment it first has 
to be defined which aspect of awareness matters and how it can be measured optimally 
(Doyen et al., 2014). From a statistical perspective, much progress has recently been made in 
the application of Bayesian statistics to the central problem in consciousness research of 
stating evidence for the null hypothesis, which is the case, for example, when the aim is to 
establish chance-level performance as a proof of objective unwareness of a stimulus (Dienes, 
2015). Therefore, any new default in consciousness research must surely involve well-
informed thinking about statistical tests and their implications. 
 
Is interocular suppression suited to rule out remaining objections? 
As Hassin argues in the paragraph A Walk Through a Garden of Objections, the YIC principle 
is often quickly criticized by devising examples of cognitive functions that would, almost by 
definition, require consciousness to fully unfold. Thus, a particularly strong test of the YIC 
principle would be to acquire evidence for the unconscious to be able to perform seemingly 
high-level cognitive functions such as reading and effortful arithmetic. This was exactly the 
goal of one experimental study which involved Hassin as senior author (Sklar et al., 2012). To 
assess the feasibility of unconscious reading and arithmetic, the authors used continuous flash 
suppression (CFS) to unconsciously present multiple-word verbal expressions or single-digit 
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equations to observers. CFS refers to an interocular suppression technique in which discrepant 
images are presented to the different eyes at corresponding retinal locations (Tsuchiya and 
Koch, 2005;Yang and Blake, 2012). In consciousness research, there has always been a trade-
off between different paradigms to present stimuli unconsciously to observers (Kim and 
Blake, 2005;Bachmann et al., 2007). For example, visual masking provides a reliable tool to 
present a stimulus in the absence of awareness, yet it suffers from a very short presentation 
time of this stimulus. Binocular rivalry provides a longer window to present stimuli 
unconsciously, but it is much harder to control how long a stimulus will be suppressed. In 
contrast, CFS provides the potential to present visual stimuli unconsciously from trial onset 
and for extended periods (i.e., on a second rather than millisecond timescale). This has 
rendered CFS an increasingly attractive technique to study the limits of unconscious 
processing
2
. As Sklar et al. (2012) argue, CFS is a “cutting edge masking technique” that 
probably will act as a “game changer” (p.19614) in consciousness research due to its 
seemingly unlimited potential to present stimuli unconsciously for extended periods of time. 
In their study, Sklar et al. (2012) use CFS in two different ways to study unconscious reading 
and arithmetic. With respect to reading, the semantic coherence and the affective value of 
multiple-word verbal expressions was manipulated, and the time it took for these expressions 
to break suppression was measured (hence “b-CFS” paradigm). The reasoning behind b-CFS 
is that differential suppression times for differential stimuli must be due to differences in 
processing during suppression if control measures can convincingly show that the stimuli 
show no intrinsic difference in detectability when no interocular suppression is involved. In 
these b-CFS experiments, Sklar et al. (2012) showed that semantically incoherent expressions 
broke suppression faster than semantically coherent ones and that the affective value of verbal 
expressions modulated suppression time such that increasing negativity of the expression 
lowered suppression times significantly. With respect to arithmetic, Sklar et al. (2012) 
presented single-digit equations with three terms  but without result (e.g., “9-3-4 =”) and 
tested whether these would influence the enumeration of a visible target number. Here, a 
significant congruency effect was observed for subtraction primes, but not for addition 
primes. For addition primes, the authors observed congruency effects only when single-digit 
equations with two terms were unconsciously presented and participants had to report whether 
a subsequently presented visible addition equation with two terms and result was correct or 
not. Based on their results, the authors concluded that the meaning of verbal expressions can 
                                                          
2
 For a complete CFS reference list, see http://www.gestaltrevision.be/en/resources/reference-guides/83-
resources/reference-guides/343 
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be extracted unconsciously and that effortful arithmetic equations can be solved without 
awareness. 
The study by Sklar et al. (2012) is not the only one that has used CFS and concluded that 
unconscious high-level (visual) processing is possible. Indeed, to name a few, studies have 
shown that word meaning (Costello et al., 2009) and word valence (Yang and Yeh, 2011) can 
be processed unconsciously, that scene congruency information can be extracted in the 
absence of visual awareness (Mudrik et al., 2011), that emotional information is processed 
during suppression (Yang et al., 2007) or that sexual orientation can bias the processing of 
unconsciously presented nude pictures (Jiang et al., 2006). 
We would like to argue, however, that this enthusiasm for the potential of CFS to explore 
uncharted territories for consciousness research is most likely premature and farfetched. The 
principal reason for this argument is that all studies that embark on finding high-level 
unconscious processing during CFS ignore the representation of the stimulus while it is being 
suppressed. That is, any paradigm that renders a visual stimulus does so by interfering with 
the processing of the unconsciously presented stimulus in some way (Fogelson et al., 2014). If 
not, the stimulus would always be visible to the observer. CFS is closely related to binocular 
rivalry, a well-known interocular suppression technique, the mechanisms of which have been 
extensively investigated in the last decades (Blake and Logothetis, 2002;Sterzer, 2013). Given 
the rather limited cognitive processing during binocular suppression (Zimba and Blake, 
1983;Blake, 1988;Cave et al., 1998;Kang et al., 2011), the default stance should thus be not to 
expect much high-level unconscious processing during CFS (Breitmeyer, 2014). Recent 
neuroimaging data suggests that the presence of CFS masks dramatically reduces neural 
activity related to the suppressed stimulus already in early visual cortex (Yuval-Greenberg 
and Heeger, 2013). Thus, the representation of the suppressed stimulus is expected to be 
rather limited to a loose collection of elemental features that are presumably coded in these 
early visual areas, despite the fact that the stimulus is presented unbeknownst to the observer 
for extended periods of time (Gayet et al., 2014). Indeed, considering the CFS literature as a 
whole sketches a more complicated and fuzzy picture about the extent to which high-level 
unconscious visual processing is possible under CFS (Heyman and Moors, 2014;Sterzer et al., 
2014;Yang et al., 2014;Ludwig and Hesselmann, 2015). The interested reader is further 
referred to Dubois & Faivre (2014) for a special issue in Frontiers in Psychology 
(Consciousness Research) on the depth of unconscious processing as inferred from different 
suppression techniques. Similar to the picture sketched based on the behavioral priming 
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literature, the picture emerging from the accumulating literature on unconscious processing 
during CFS is rather “definitely maybe” than “yes it can”. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In our commentary, we have presented arguments against the YIC principle which states that 
unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level cognitive function that 
conscious processes can perform. We argued that the apparent strength of the YIC principle is 
based on an idealized review of the available literature and that it ignores the ongoing and 
lively methodological discussions on how to appropriately study unconscious processing. 
Furthermore, the proposed potential of a paradigm such as continuous flash suppression to 
rule out any remaining objections regarding YIC was claimed to be overvalued and based on a 
similarly idealized reading of the literature. While we agree with Hassin that progress in 
science requires new ideas and defaults, we would argue that rather than “yes it can” a more 
skeptical “definitely maybe” is in much better accordance with the current state of affairs. 
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